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Regulating Doctors
by Carl E. Schneider

A

lawyer today can hardly speak to
a doctor--or even be treated by
one-without being assailed by
lawyer jokes. These jokes go well beyond good-humored badinage and pass
the line into venom and gall. They reflect, I think, the sense many doctors
today have that they are embattled and
endangered, cruelly subject to pervasive
and perverse controls.
This is puzzling, almost to the point
of mystery. Doctors have long been the
American profession with the greatest
social prestige, the greatest wealth, and
the greatest control over its work. Indeed, what other profession has been as
all-conquering? One may need to go
back to the seventeenth-century clergy,
and before them perhaps to that gloriously predominant profession-knighthood. This mystery is worth exploring
because ultimately regulating the profession is crucial to many of bioethicists'
hopes. So let us explore it.

The Physicians' Lament

"\VJhen you press doctors to explain
W their distress, you hear that the
law regulates medicine too closely. And
you hear most about the law of malpractice. Yet though our malpractice regime
is far from admirable, doctors are wrong
in much of their indictment of it.
Physicians' first charge against the
law of malpractice is that it imports external criteria to evaluate doctors. This is
baffling. The law sedulously uses the
standard of care established by medical
practice. It does so even though much
tort law is moving toward strict (that is,
no-fault) liability for injuries and even
though the arguments for strict liability-including consumer tgnorance,
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plaintiffs' difficulty in proving fault, the
desirability of spreading the costs of
injuries, and strict liability's deterrent
effect-apply to medical services.
Second, doctors say juries are proplaintiff, anti-doctor, incompetent, and
prodigal. Sometimes, perhaps, but plaintiffs appear to win malpractice suits only
one-fifth to one-third of the time. 1 Furthermore, one study of 117 malpractice
cases in North Carolina found that
while the average award was $367,737,
the median award was only $36,500.
The average was inflated by four cases
with awards ranging from $2.9 million
to $750,000. Three of those cases involved serious injuries, including (in
each case) brain damage; in the fourth
the patient died. (The largest element of
most awards tends to be the cost of
medical services incurred because of the
malpractice.) According to the study,
jurors "often were suspicious of the
plaintiff's decision to bring suit and frequently mentioned their concerns about
the effects of verdicts on insurance rates
and other social costs of large damage
awards." They said things like, "We all
go through hardships in life, ... and we
won't always be able to blame or get
what we think we deserve" (p. 121).
Doctors' third charge against malpractice law is that it necessitates "defensive medicine." Physicians do faithfully report to the American Medical
Association that they practice defensive
medicine. Doctors may indeed overtreat
some patients. But why? Because of
malpractice law? Out of an abundance
of caution? Because the fee-for-service
system doctors have historically used
creates a financial incentive to do so?
Some defensive medicine is probably
due to the remarkable fact that doctors

overestimate the annual rate of suit by a
factor of three, overestimate the risk of
suit from an incident of negligence by a
factor of almost five, and overestimate
the risk of suit from an adverse event by
a factor of eleven. 2 But we can fairly ask
that doctors not respond irrationally to
malpractice law, that doctors have a realistic sense of the chances of being sued.
Paul Weiler, one of the ablest students of medical malpractice, observes
that evidence of "defensive medicine"
would in other contexts "be viewed as a
positive compliment to the law," since it
looks like evidence that the law deters
negligence. He concludes that "[m]alpractice law has played a valuable role in
stimulating broad-based improvements
in the institutional environment and
procedures through which medical care
is provided.... "3
In sum, the standard elements of
doctors' attacks on the law of malpractice seem strangely insubstantial. And
the profession's animus toward that law
is yet more striking when one grasps
how responsive the law has been to
doctors' discontents. For example, when
doctors complained (with scant reason)
that they risked being sued by accident
victims they had stopped to assist, legislatures obligingly passed "Good Samaritan" statutes. (Happily, studies suggest
that these laws do not affect doctors'
willingness to help the injured in emergencies.)
Similarly, the malpractice "crisis" of
recent years illustrated just how eagerly
the law can defer to medicine. State legislatures alertly responded to doctors'
indignation with a deluge of soothing
statutes that attempted to narrow the
standard of liability, to cap damage
awards, and to constrain access to courts
with devices like limitation periods,
screening procedures, and limitations
on attorney fees.
The medical profession's reaction to
the law of malpractice would be more
understandable if the profession had
demonstrated a livelier interest in finding ways of dealing with incompetent
doctors and of protecting patients injured by malpractice. But doctors have
no more to boast of than lawyers in this
respect. As Weiler observes,
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[T]here is notorious underreporting of incompetent practice by the
doctor's professional peers. Even if
the physicians in charge of a hospital or clinic observe or learn of the
danger posed by one of their colleagiles, their natural inclination is
simply to ease the offending doctor
out of the institution rather than go
public with complaints to the authorities. (p. 108)
Weiler adds that state medical boards
"appear disinclined to judge their colleagues sufficiently incompetent to lose
the right to practice entirely" (p. 109).
And where medicine has shown some
interest in deterring incompetent carefor example, in creating risk-management and quality-assurance programsthe profession has not infrequently
seemed driven by fears of malpractice
liability.
Still There Are Problems

D

espite all I have said, the medicalmalpractice system is surely unsatisfactory. Its fault, however, is not so
much that it harasses doctors, but that
it disserves plaintiffs. First, the system is
a painfully expensive method of compensating injured patients. Again, Weiler: "[T]he malpractice litigation and liability insurance system forces doctors
and hospitals to collect $7 billion from
their patients to deliver $3 billion into
the hands of a selection of injured patients" (p. 91).
Second, far from there being too
many plaintiffs, there are too few: One
of the best studies found that only oneeighth of all potential claims are actually filed. And "even when we narrowed
our focus to the more serious and 'valuable' tort claims-iatrogenic injuries to
patients under seventy that produced
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disabilities (including death) lasting six
months or more-we still found that
for every 3 such events there was only 1
tort payment" (p. 13).
The mystery, then, is how so successful a profession can feel so enfeebled by
so misunderstood a threat. Like all largescale social mysteries, this one has many
causes. For example, doctors sometimes
seem to abandon the scientific method
when it comes to nonmedical reasoning. In the small and insular world of
medicine, horror stories proliferate. In
each story may lurk a kernel of truth.
But soon the story circulates, unaccompanied by the facts that might dilute its
force, like news of settlements or appellate court reversals. It gains strength with
the retelling and soon loses contact with
its origin. Since the rumor confirms subcultural views, it is widely credited.
But there are also weightier forces at
work. Physicians, like most professionals (not least lawyers), see the good they
can do with power and appreciate the
prerogatives that come with it. As
Robert Zussman concludes, "Physicians
are not concerned about specific and
limited legal obligations. Instead, they
are concerned with the basis of medical
discretion. From this perspective, the
point is not what the law says but the
simple fact that it says anything at all." 4
Furthermore, while they misdiagnose the reasons for it, doctors are indeed losing the professional authority
and autonomy they have come to expect and enjoy. We live in the age of
distrust, and like most American social
institutions, medicine has experienced
declining cultural power. But this declining cultural power is not just a product of the times or even of the market.
It is also a product of the belief that
medicine has, like all professions, like all
institutions, sometimes abused the
power it has had. This is the lesson of

Tuskegee, of Willowbrook, of the law of
informed consent. This is the lesson the
patients I have interviewed draw from
their dealings with physicians they too
often found unskilled and unkind.5
But this is not the greatest source of
doctors' loss of power. Medicine is
changing from a profession of solo practitioners to a profession of bureaucrats.
More and more doctors work for hospitals, HMOs, or urgent care centers, and
those who do not are often driven to
joining preferred provider organizations.
More and more of their work is invigilated by ever-more inquisitive thirdparty payers, like insurance companies,
Medicare, and Medicaid. Utilization
management organizations require second opinions, discharge planning, highcost case management, preservice certification, and concurrent review. The
professional autonomy of the individual
doctor now seems at risk. It may be
partly to this development that doctors
are reacting. And not without reasons.
But it may be more profitable to address
those reasons directly without being diverted by misplaced indignation about
the law of malpractice.
References

1. Neil Vidmar, "The Unfair Criticism of
Medical Malpractice Juries," judicature 76
(1992): 118-24, at 118, 119-20.
2. Paul C. Weiler, Howard H. Hiatt, and
Joseph P. Newhouse, A Measure ofMalpractice:

Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 124.
3. Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on
Trial (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1991), p. 91.
4. Roben Zussman, Intensive Care: Medical
Ethics and the Medical Profession (Chicago:
UniversityofChicago Press, 1992), p. 184.
5. Carl E. Schneider, The Practice ofAuton-

omy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),
pp. 182-227.

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 21 Jun 2017 19:11:37 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

July-August 1999

